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This is the third component in a series that estimates the fiscal impacts of varying the 
eligibility and premium requirements of the Nebraska Medicaid Buy-In program.  The first 
component estimated how Buy-In program participation rates might differ when eligibility and 
premium requirements varied. (See McGarvey, Mary M., Enrollment Projections for Nebraska’s Medicaid 
Insurance for Workers with Disabilities, 2003, University of Nebraska Center for Public Policy.)  The second 
component was a calculator designed to estimate state and federal costs related to selected social 
programs.  The third component puts these first two components together.  (See Rosenbaum, David 
I., Estimating the Fiscal Impacts of Changes in Eligibility and/or Premium Requirements for Nebraska’s Medicaid 
Buy-In Program, 2004, University of Nebraska Center for Public Policy.)  It combines participation, income 
and cost estimates to determine the fiscal impacts of proposed changes in the Nebraska Medicaid 
Buy-In program.  The findings of that analysis are summarized here. 
Seven alternative Buy-In program scenarios are considered.  Each scenario can vary 
eligibility and/or premium requirements.  The alternate scenarios are described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Alternative Buy-In Scenarios 
Scenario Description 
1 - Asset Limit $10,000 Rather than $4,000 
2 - Asset Limit $20,000 Rather than $4,000 
3 - No Premium 
4 
 
- Premium Begins at 150% of FPG Rather than 200% 
- Unearned Income Disregarded 
5 
 
- SSI Countable Income Limit 450% of FPG Instead of 250% 
- Sliding Premium Scale for 250% to 450% of FPG 
6 
 
- Premium Begins at 150% of FPG Rather than 200% 
- Asset Limit $12,000 Rather than $4,000 
7 - SSI Countable Income Limit 450% of FPG Instead of 250% 
- Unearned Income Disregarded 
- Asset Limit $20,000 Rather than $4,000 
- Premium is 10% of Income Above 200% FPG 
 
The fiscal impact analysis looks at both state and federal expenditures for energy 
assistance, AABD grants, block grants, food stamps, AABD Medicaid and the working disabled.  
The analysis also looks at state income tax receipts, as well as federal income and social 
security/Medicare tax receipts. 
Initially, participation rates and both state and federal expenditures are estimated under 
the current eligibility and premium requirements of the Nebraska Medicaid Buy-In program.  
Then, participation rates and costs are estimated under each of the alternative scenarios.  The 
alternative scenario results are compared to values under the current program to estimate overall 
participation and fiscal impacts.  Finally, relative changes in participation rates and costs are 
calculated.  These relative changes are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Summary of Relative Impacts of Alternative Medicaid Buy-In Scenarios 
 
  
Relative 
Change in 
Participation 
Relative 
Change in 
State 
Expenditures 
Relative 
Change in 
Federal 
Expenditures 
Scenario    
1 - Asset Limit $10,000 Rather than $4,000 0% 0% 0% 
2 - Asset Limit $20,000 Rather than $4,000 0% 0% 0% 
3 - No Premium 16% 0.5% 1.2% 
4 - Premium Begins at 150% of FPG Rather than 200% 
   - Unearned Income Disregarded 
 
34% 
 
0.8% 
 
1.6% 
5 - SSI Countable Income Limit 450% of FPG Instead of 250% 
   - Sliding Premium Scale for 250% to 450% of FPG 
 
41% 
 
1.2% 
 
8.5% 
6 - Premium Begins at 150% of FPG Rather than 200% 
   - Asset Limit $12,000 Rather than $4,000 
 
-5% 
 
-0.1% 
 
-0.2% 
7 - SSI Countable Income Limit 450% of FPG Instead of 250% 
   - Unearned Income Disregarded 
   - Asset Limit $20,000 Rather than $4,000 
   - Premium is 10% of Income Above 200% FPG 
 
 
 
70% 
 
 
 
1.4% 
 
 
 
1% 
 
Scenarios 1 and 2 have no impact on participation or cost.  Apparently the asset limit is 
not affecting individuals’ decisions to participate in the Buy-In program.  Scenario 3’s removal 
of a premium increases participation by 16 percent.  The state’s total costs increase by only one 
half of one percent.  Federal costs increase by 1.2 percent. 
In Scenario 4, the premium threshold is reduced, but this is coupled with an unearned 
income disregard.  Participation increases by one third while the state’s overall costs increase by 
about one percent.  Scenario 5 increases the countable income limit and introduces a sliding 
premium scale.  Enrollments increase by 41 percent.  State costs increase by 1.2 percent.  Federal 
cost increases are more significant. 
Results in Scenario 6 are driven by the reduction in the premium threshold since assets do 
not affect participation.  Enrollments fall by five percent and expenditures are relatively 
unchanged.  Scenario 7 combines many of the features that should make the Buy-In program 
attractive to the working disabled.  Enrollments increase by 70 percent.  Yet state overall costs 
increase by only 1.4 percent. 
Changing Buy-In program eligibility and premium requirements can have an impact on 
enrollments and state expenditures.  The relative enrollment effects, however, are much more 
pronounced than the expenditure effects.  The alternative scenarios caused enrollments to go 
from a drop of 5 percent to an increase of 70 percent.  In contrast, overall state expenditures 
never changed by more than 2 percent.  The implication is that in relative terms, significantly 
more disabled individuals can be brought into the workforce at a small relative cost increase to 
the state. 
 
